In 2008 and 2009, bondholders of ailing companies were affected by a reemergence of an important corporate restructuring strategy, known as a Distressed Exchange. Fourteen companies in 2008 completed this desperate attempt to avoid a formal bankruptcy filing -about twice as many as any single year in the last 25 years, involving twice as much in dollar amount than in the entire prior history . And, in just the first four months of 2009, nine firms have already completed distressed exchanges. The recovery rate to bondholders participating in distressed exchanges over the last 25 years is significantly higher than recoveries on other, more dramatic types of default -namely payment defaults and bankruptcies. But, there is no guarantee that a distressed exchange will permanently immunize the firm from further distress, with almost 50% of all companies completing distressed exchanges prior to 2008 ultimately filing for bankruptcy.
INTRODUCTION
The year 2008 saw the prominent reemergence of a classical restructuring mechanism known as a distressed-exchange (DE). This tactic is usually an attempt by an ailing firm to avoid bankruptcy by proposing a fundamental change in the contractual relationship between a debtor and its various creditor classes and is "voluntarily" agreed upon by a sufficient percentage (usually 90% or more) of relevant creditor claims. While one of the most common and dramatic DE involves a substitution of lower priority equity securities for debt claims, DEs can also result from a reduction of the effective interest rate on the debt, a subordination of claims, an extension of time to repay the debt or a package of new securities, cash and other securities, that have a total value that is less than the face value of the original debt claim. Another critical component is the condition that the original claim is selling at a distressed price at the time of the DE announcement, usually below 70 cents on the US dollar. The resulting situation is still called a DE even if the price of the existing debt increases after the announcement.
The first instances of DEs in the modern high-yield bond era were the so-called 3(a)9 exchange championed by Drexel Burnham Lambert in the 1980s. These exchanges were particularly attractive to the distressed firms because they did not require Securities and Exchange Commission review and could be accomplished quickly, usually in less than a month. A second critical element was that the exchange was tax-free, even if the new securities had a combined value of less than the original claim. This tax-free exemption changed in the early 1990s when the reduction in debt was considered a taxable event. This revised tax ruling is still in effect, regardless of whether the company is in a distressed condition. Hence, there is little incentive for a highly solvent firm to exchange its debt for equity and reduce its leverage when the consequence would be a meaningful increase in taxes. As such, these exchanges will usually only take place when a firm is desperately trying to avoid an even more costly bankruptcy, and also usually where it has sufficient tax-loss credits to offset the taxable exchange.
In a preliminary discussion of DEs (Altman & Karlin, 2009) , it was proposed that it was time to revisit this tax ruling, since the deleveraging of corporate America is a meaningful objective.
Very soon after, we learned that the economic stimulus legislation that passed Congress in While a few earlier studies such as, for example, Gilson et al (1990) showed that out-ofcourt restructurings were considerably less costly than bankruptcies to the debtor firm, in many cases the DE was followed by a bankruptcy anyway. Our own results, discussed below, show that out of 57 DEs completed prior to 2008 at least 26 (46%) were followed by a bankruptcy filing, and the majority of others resulted in a change of ownership of the debtor (ie, were acquired).
IMPLIMCATIONS OF DISTRESSED EXCHANGES
Distressed exchanges have important implications for credit markets. Firstly, just about all instances of DEs are now categorized as a "default" in the calculations of default rates, including in our own calculations. There is still some debate, however, as to whether the entire debt issue involved in a DE should be counted as a default or only the actual amount tendered in the exchange.
Another debatable issue is over what date the debt should be considered in default: when the DE is announced or when it is completed. This is particularly relevant for the computation of the recovery rate of the default event. The policy is to count a DE that has been accepted by the requisite proportion of claimants at the time the announcement of the tender offer took place, unless there were changes in the terms of the exchange or other material events took place, as in the case of GMAC (discussed below). In addition, we only count the face value amount of claims that are tendered, not the total outstanding amount of the debt issue.
DISTRESSED EXCHANGE DEFAULTS IN THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP MARKET
An important consequence of a completed DE had been that it was possible, but not likely, that it would trigger a default event in the credit default swap (CDS) market. This is known as a modified restructuring (MOD-R) default. Ever since this market began developing in the late 1990s, there has been a recurring ambiguity over whether a DE or other significant negative firm development would trigger a default and unwinding of the transaction. Evolving In the past, triggers for DEs that changed the terms of existing debt included an equity for debt swap, a drop in coupon, extension of maturity or creation of contractual subordination, but only if it is within the context of the existing bond or loan (ie, if it has the same Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures CUSIP) security identifier. It is in a form that binds all holders of the obligation and it is "voluntary" in that only investors who accept and tender their bonds are subject to what the issuer proposes. Hence, there was no default event even if those not accepting had their priority subordinated vis-à-vis those accepting (ISDA, 2003) . In the case of the GMAC in 2008, where less than 60% of the par value amount of the issue were bound by the exchange, a CDS default was not triggered. The same was true in all of the 2008 DEs. The corporate market has not experienced any distressed exchanges that triggered a default in the CDS market in recent years, although it has been observed in the sovereign market (eg, Argentina). Outside of a prepackaged Chapter 11, US corporations have found it extremely difficult to affect an exchange which would qualify as a default under ISDA guidelines. As noted above, a proposal to eliminate a "modified exchange" as a default trigger in CDS contracts was adopted in order to avoid confusion and costly lawsuits. Therefore, only a failure to pay interest or a bankruptcy will qualify after March 2009.
The distinction between a default in the primary market (and what investors believe will be their ultimate recovery) and what triggers a payout in the CDS market helps to explain why CDS spreads have recently been tighter for many distressed credits than CDS spreads in the bond market. Other reasons for tighter spreads are liquidity and funding differences, but it is difficult to isolate each factor.
DISTRESSED EXCHANGES IN 2008
To say that a resurgence in the incidence of DEs was observed in 2008 is a gross understatement. Indeed, the number of DEs in 2008 (14) was almost double the number for any year since 1984 (see Table 1 ). The total amount of DEs ($30.3 billion) was more than twice the total amount from the years 1984-2007 combined. Firms appear to be scrambling to avoid bankruptcy like never before, and due to their significant tax-loss credits, they are not concerned about the taxable nature of the debt reductions.
challenged by creditors in the hope that the debtor will sweeten the offer. Several instances of this occurred in 2008, the most publicized of which was the recently completed GMAC exchange. If the DE goes through despite some proportion that is not tendered, those not tendering will continue to have a claim of full face value should a bankruptcy subsequently occur.
The saga of the 2008 GMAC/Residential Capital exchange has been exceptional for several reasons. It involved the US government in a material way and it is by far the largest DE in history.
The initial DE offer was a complicated package of cash, new debt and preferred stock that was advertised as needing a tender of at least 75% of the outstanding debt amounts of both GMAC and Residential Capital, a subsidiary of GMAC. The 75% was the amount supposedly necessary for the Federal Reserve to grant GMAC status as a bank holding company, thereby giving it access to the FED's discount window and its low-cost debt borrowings.
It appeared that the 75% was not going to be achieved, although the bank holding company status was formally announced subject to the requisite amount of new equity capital being raised, ostensibly in the equity for debt swap from the DE. When it became obvious that the 75% was not going to be achieved, the US government trumped that requirement by investing US$5 billion directly in preferred stock of GMAC and loaning an additional US$1 billion to GM for the purpose of that firm's purchase of additional preferred securities. Hence, the 75% exchange was not necessary and GMAC accepted the 59% of GMAC bonds tendered as well as the 39% tendered to Residential Capital. De facto, the usual 90% requirement, or even the 75% stated in the objective, was not relevant and the DE was achieved.
The irony of the GMAC DE is that all creditors (both those that tendered and those that did not) were pleased with the exchange since the prices on all existing bonds spiked significantly due to the government's enormous equity "bailout" infusion. The upfront premium on the CDS of the remaining GMAC bonds also dropped dramatically from about 44% as of the day before the firm accounted for about 7.2% of all defaulting issuers and 10.0% of all default dollar amounts (see Table 1 ). 1997 0.00 4,200.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 1996 0.00 3,336.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 1995 0.00 4,551.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 1994 0.00 3,418.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 1993 0.00 2,287.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 1992 0.00 5,545.00 0.0 0 0 0.0 n/a n/a n/a 
RECOVERY RATES ON DISTRESSED EXCHANGES
Since DEs are not as dramatic a testimony to the firm's distressed status as to a bankruptcy or non-payment of cash interest on the debt, one might expect that the recovery rate on DE defaults will be higher than other, more serious distressed situations. Indeed, the data backs this up. Table 1 shows that the arithmetic average recovery rate on all DE defaults was 50.88% for the period 1984-2009 compared to 42.32% for all defaults and 37.3% for all non-DE defaults (see Table 2 ). In 2008 alone, DEs recovered 52.2% while non-DE defaults recovered only 27.1%.
In Table 2 , we calculate a difference in means test between the arithmetic average recovery rate (49.1%) 3 on the 70 DEs over the period 1984-2008 compared to the average recovery rate on all non-DE defaults (37.3%) over the same period. We find that given the above, the DE recovery rate is significantly higher (t = 5.76) at the 1% confidence level. It is not surprising that bondholders will choose, in many instances, to accept a recovery with certainty from a DE rather than take the chance of holding out for an uncertain, and probably lower, recovery in bankruptcy. Our results do not include data for situations when a DE offer is rejected. It is safe to assume, however, that most of these scenarios would be associated with a subsequent bankruptcy petition. Investors still must decide, given the completion of a DE, whether to hold on to the new set of securities from the exchange or to sell as quickly as is feasible. It can safely be said that if a bankruptcy takes place subsequent to a DE, then the default recovery after bankruptcy will be considerably lower than it would have been had the investor sold immediately after the DE, perhaps by about 20%. What is not known is the likely positive average return on those situations when a bankruptcy is permanently avoided after the DE. 
SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCE OF DE FIRMS
An important follow-on question to the DE restructuring strategy is over the subsequent performance of the firm and its securities. This has been assessed this by tracking the firms 
THE TREND OF DES DISTRESSED EXCHANGES
We expect DEs to continue without abatement in 2009 due to the sheer record number of distressed companies as well as changes in the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 that made it more difficult to reorganize successfully (ie, to emerge as a going concern at the end of the reorganization process). As noted earlier, we observed an unprecedented appetite in 2008 to restructure out-of-court rather than risk bankruptcy and liquidation. 5 No doubt, the difficulty in raising debtor-in-possession loans and exit-financing influenced the decision to file for bankruptcy. Indeed, prior to 2008, our statistics (Altman and Hotchkiss (2005) found that as much as 60-65% of large Chapter 11s in the 20 years prior to 2008 were successful in emerging from the bankruptcy process as a "going concern," although a non-significant number (about 200) ultimately filed again ).
In addition 
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to highlight the re-emergence of a type of distressed restructuring strategy known as a distressed exchange. The combination of an elevated fear of liquidations in bankruptcy, sizeable net operating losses to offset debt forgiveness taxes, and increased aggressiveness on the part of corporate advisors has motivated a significant increase in 
